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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OVERSEAS: IS
EXTRATERRITORIAL PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
NATIONALS GOING TOO FAR?
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment1 protects the individual's right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Originally intended to guard
United States citizens against unreasonable intrusion by government offi-
cials in this country,3 the amendment was gradually expanded to shelter
aliens found within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.4
Courts then determined that United States citizens were entitled to
fourth amendment protection by virtue of their citizenship, regardless of
their location at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.5
Recently, however, courts have considered whether the fourth amend-
ment can be further expanded to protect foreign nationals from actions
by United States officials on foreign soil.6 The resolution of this issue
depends upon whether the primary purpose of the fourth amendment is
to safeguard individual rights7 or to restrain the activities of the govern-
ment.8 This Note argues that the amendment is designed to preserve the
I. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 202 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (fourth amendment prohibits government interference with fun-
damental individual liberty); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 235 (1960) (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (fourth amendment addresses matters that "vitally relate to
individual freedom"); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-92 (1914) (fourth
amendment intended to secure to Americans those safeguards that originated in England
to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures).
3. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914); Adams v. New York, 192
U.S. 585, 598 (1904); J. Hirschel, Fourth Amendment Rights 1 (1979).
4. See infra note 12 and accompanying text. See generally J. Hirschel, supra note 3,
at 1 (fourth amendment grants private persons on American soil a guarantee against
unreasonable government intrusion).
5. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
6. See, eg., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1215 (9th Cir. 1988)
(foreign national entitled to fourth amendment protection), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W.
3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-1353); Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909, 915-17 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Colombian national might have standing to challenge violations of the fourth
amendment); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974) (defendant
Italian citizen unlawfully seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights).
7. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); J. Varon, Searches, Seizures
and Immunities addendum at 11 (2d ed. 1974) (purpose of fourth amendment viewed as
measure of prevention for individual against unreasonable government intrusion into pri-
vacy of one's person, house, papers or effects).
8. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (fourth amendment is
purposeful recognition that law enforcement officers may become too zealous in carrying
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individual rights of United States citizens and individuals on United
States soil from arbitrary and unreasonable government activity. This
intent is thwarted when fourth amendment guarantees are applied to for-
eign nationals abroad.
Part I discusses the background of the fourth amendment in light of
the evolving constitutional climate. Part II analyzes the fourth amend-
ment and examines the amendment's extraterritorial operation in light of
cases purporting to extend its guarantees to foreigners abroad. Part III
argues that there are viable alternatives to overbroad application that will
preserve the rights of nonresidents without unnecessarily broadening the
scope of the fourth amendment. This Note concludes that when govern-
ment action takes place on foreign soil not subject to United States sover-
eignty, the fourth amendment should not be used to grant protection to
aliens claiming no ties to the United States.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL GROWTH AND EXPANSION
The fourth amendment and other protections granted in the Bill of
Rights began as assurances that certain rights were to be reserved to the
individual.9 The framers of the Constitution intended to protect individ-
uals in the United States from unreasonable intrusion by government offi-
cials.10 Consequently, courts initially took a restrictive view of the power
of the Constitution to extend beyond United States territory.11 Society's
increasing mobility, however, made it necessary to determine whether
the Constitution protected aliens in the United States and United States
citizens in foreign territories. In response to these changing circum-
stances, courts have interpreted the Constitution as safeguarding the
rights of all individuals within the United States, 2 regardless of citizen-
out their activities); see also Saltzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra
Firma of the United States, 20 Va. J. Int'l L. 741, 742 (1980) (Bill of Rights espoused as
the most important limit on the central government's power to act, adopted "to assure
that [the government's] authority to claim certain powers would be expressly negated").
9. See A. Kelly, W. Harbison & H. Belz, The American Constitution-Its Origins
and Development 110 (6th ed. 1983).
10. See J. Creamer, A Citizen's Guide to Legal Rights 116 (1st ed. 1971) (framers
sought to protect individuals); Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 743 (many of the first ten
amendments designed to protect individuals suspected of, or charged with, crime); supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
11. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) ("By the Constitution a government is
ordained and established 'for the United States of America,' and not for countries outside
of [its] limits."); see also Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (Con-
stitution "contains grants of power and limitations which... are not always and every-
where applicable"). See generally Damrosch, Foreign States and the Constitution, 73 Va.
L. Rev. 483, 487 (1987) ("permanent outsiders ... seem to have little claim to invoke
constitutional 'rights' "); Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the Application of Consti-
tutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 287, 300-01 (1985)
("the Constitution is a compact between citizens and their government that is unenforce-
able by aliens").
12. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (alien who has entered
United States and considered part of its population entitled to due process under fifth
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ship, and United States citizens wherever they encounter United States
government action.1
3
The fourth amendment secures the citizen "in person and property
[against] unlawful invasion of the sanctity of [his] home"14 and is in-
tended to protect the individual from "unreasonable" searches and
seizures.1 When discussing the potential extraterritorial expansion of
the fourth amendment, one must examine the amendment in the context
of the fundamental purpose of the Bill of Rights-protection of the rights
of the individual. 16
amendment); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 989 n.45 (5th Cir. 1975) (courts
have sometimes held that resident aliens are entitled to same rights as American citizens),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). But see Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945)
(Murphy, J., concurring) (alien attempting to enter this country brings with him no con-
stitutional rights); United States ex reL Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)
(alien attempting illegal entry is not one of the people protected by the first amendment);
Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252, 254 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (nonresident aliens "plainly can-
not appeal to the protection of the Constitution or laws of the United States"), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960). See generally Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187
(1958) (where aliens are domiciled within the United States, the Court has recognized
additional rights and privileges not extended to those on the threshold of initial entry);
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (mere lawful presence in this country
grants the alien certain rights); Damrosch, supra note 11, at 553-55 & nn.292-98 (ac-
knowledges authority of Constitution to protect individuals present in United States from
government actions).
13. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957) ("[w]hen the Government reaches out to
punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights ... provide[s]...
should not be stripped away just becanse he happens to be in another land").
Reid established that the Bill of Rights may be applied to the conduct of federal offi-
cials acting upon American citizens abroad. See Note, The Applicability of the Exclusion-
ary Rule in Federal Court to Evidence Seized and Confessions Obtained in Foreign
Countries, 16 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 495, 502 (1977); see also United States v. Conroy,
589 F.2d 1258, 1264 (5th Cir.) (fourth amendment protects all individuals within United
States and shelters citizens abroad from unreasonable searches by the United States gov-
ernment), cert denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); Note, The Extraterritorial Application of the
Constitution-Unalienable Rights?, 72 Va. L. Rev. 649, 657 (1986) [hereinafter Note,
Unalienable Rights?] ("all constitutional protections afforded at home should apply with
equal vigor for the benefit of citizens abroad").
Another court held that a United States citizen on a foreign ship, just as on foreign soil,
has rights against an unreasonable search and seizure by United States government au-
thorities. See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1093 (5th Cir. 1980). But cf
Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1189 (2d Cir. 1980) (Bill of Rights does not protect
United States citizens "from the acts of a foreign sovereign committed within its terri-
tory"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
14. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904). See generally J. Creamer, supra
note 10, at 116 (fourth amendment protection conferred upon individual as most valued
right of civilized men).
15. Fourth amendment requirements apply only to searches and seizures. However,
the amendment does not prohibit all searches, nor does it forbid all searches conducted
without a warrant. See, eg., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (war-
rantless searches permitted if made incident to lawful arrest); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (certain items may be seized without warrant when in
plain view of officer lawfully present at scene); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,
65 (1950) ("mandate of the Fourth Amendment is that the people shall be secure against
unreasonable searches").
16. See supra notes 7, 9 and accompanying text.
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The gradual expansion of constitutional protections has not altered the
interpretation of that primary purpose. Extending constitutional rights
to United States citizens abroad merely recognizes that constitutional
guarantees are a fundamental element of American citizenship."7 Courts
interpreting the Constitution to protect aliens while in the United
States"8 reasoned that the alien, once lawfully admitted to the United
States, acquired certain rights comparable to those of the citizen.19 Ex-
tending the fourth amendment to protect non-citizens in foreign territo-
ries from United States government action would, however, change the
amendment's focus.2" Such an extension would require that courts inter-
pret the Bill of Rights as a body of law intended to restrict government
action rather than to protect individual rights.2 Although the fourth
17. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The landmark decision in Reid per-
mitted the courts to exercise jurisdiction abroad on the basis of the accused's United
States citizenship. In dismissing the holding of In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891),
Justice Black said: "The Ross case ... cannot be understood except in its peculiar set-
ting.... [Its] approach that the Constitution has no applicability abroad ... is obviously
erroneous if the United States Government... can and does try citizens for crimes com-
mitted abroad." Reid, 354 U.S. at 10, 12 (emphasis added).
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
19. Several commentators have also discussed this principle. See, e.g., N. Alexander,
Rights of Aliens Under the Federal Constitution 88 (1931); see also id. at 5; 3 G. Hack-
worth, Digest of International Law 660 (1940); A. Roth, The Minimum Standard of
International Law Applied to Aliens 25 (1949); Borchard, The Law of Responsibility of
States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, 23 Am.
J. Int'l L. spec. supp. 233, art. 2, app. 6 (1929); Note, Unalienable Rights?, supra note 13,
at 665. See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-
1353):
[Tihe scope of an alien's rights depends ... on the extent to which he has
chosen to shoulder the burdens that citizens must bear. Not until an alien has
assumed the complete range of obligations.. . [imposed] on the citizenry may
he be... entitled to the full panoply of rights guaranteed by our Constitution.
Id. at 1236.
20. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1231 (Wallace, J., dissenting); see also
Damrosch, supra note 11, at 488 n.14 (the term "the people" as used in the fourth
amendment may correspond to its use in the Preamble as well as in other constitutional
provisions). See generally United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137 (1984) (Brennan,
3., dissenting) (fourth amendment's fundamental principles cannot be discarded when
guarantees are applied to modern developments).
21. See Cardenas v. Smith, 733 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In Cardenas, the court
addressed the ability of a non-resident alien to seek redress in American courts for
wrongs allegedly infficted on foreign soil by the Attorney General of the United States.
See id. at 910-11. The court remarked on the apparent tendency of various circuits to
recognize situations in which non-resident aliens can invoke constitutional restraints
upon the United States government. See id. at 916. Nevertheless, the court could not
articulate any working definition of those situations or any delineation of the group of
non-resident aliens protected by the Constitution. See id.
The Cardenas court also recognized the inherent danger in painting constitutional pro-
tections with too broad a stroke, stating that "[g]iven the difficulties and far-reaching
consequences of a doctrine that enhances an alien's standing to put on a constitutional
mantle, we are reluctant to apply such a rationale to [this] case." Id. at 917; see also
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (declining to decide
question whether constitutional protections applied to noncitizens abroad); Jean v. Nel-
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amendment does act as a restraint on government action,2 2 the trend in
recent years has been to focus on the amendment as a safeguard of indi-
vidual rights.23
Nevertheless, in United States v. Verdugo- Urquidez,24 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit extended fourth amendment protection to a
foreign national whose residence in Mexico was searched by United
States officials.25 The Verdugo court construed the fourth amendment as
a restriction on government action,26 failing to consider that the amend-
ment was intended to protect individuals having some affiliation with the
United States.27
The Ninth Circuit held that the fourth amendment's constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure applied to the
United State government's unwarranted search of the Mexicali residence
of a reputed drug smuggler.2" Evidence obtained in the search was sup-
son, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). Appel-
lees in Jean argued that fifth amendment analysis should center on the fact of government
action without regard to the citizenship of the individual involved. See id. at 972. The
court dismissed this argument, pointing out that if the Constitution unequivocally limited
exercise of governmental power, then
all aliens in all circumstances would presumably be entitled to the full range of
constitutional protections. This is clearly not the case. Instead, the courts have
made it plain that the degree of constitutional protection accorded an alien in a
particular situation is to be determined by such factors as the legal status of the
alien and the context of the government action he seeks to challenge.
Id. at 972.
22. See Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 744 ("design of the fourth amendment ... suggests
the framers' concern about overly ambitious law enforcement").
23. See National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 109 S. Ct. 1384, 1390
(1989) (drug testing program invasion of individual's reasonable expectation of privacy);
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1412-13 (1989) (fourth
amendment protects individual's expectation of privacy against physical intrusion neces-
sary to obtain bodily fluids for drug testing); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846 F.2d
1539, 1542 (6th Cir. 1988) (fourth amendment protection necessary to preserve individ-
ual privacy and dignity infringed by mandatory urinalysis testing); see also Simien, The
Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Object to Unrea-
sonable Searches, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 487, 567 (1988) ("beyond dispute that the fourth
amendment protects individual rights").
24. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18,
1989) (No. 88-1353).
25. See id. at 1218, 1224.
26. See id. at 1218 (Constitution limits government's authority when it acts abroad).
27. See id. at 1235-36 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (extending fourth amendment to con-
strain actions of United States agents abroad ignores significance of residency within the
United States to question of alien's constitutional rights).
28. See id. at 1215. Appellee Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was apprehended by
Mexican officials in Mexicali, Mexico and delivered to United States Marshals. See id.
The DEA, believing that an inspection of Verdugo-Urquidez's Mexican residence would
disclose evidence, searched his home with Mexican cooperation and uncovered drug tally
sheets, which the government attempted to introduce at trial. See id. at 1216-17.
Verdugo-Urquidez then moved to suppress this evidence on the grounds that it was ob-




pressed on these grounds.29
The dissenting opinion by Judge Wallace followed the basic doctrine
that the fourth amendment protects only aliens residing in the United
States, arguing that the majority's broad interpretation of the Bill of
Rights ignored the self-imposed limitations on the geographic reach of
the Constitution repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court.3" These
limitations recognize the Constitution as a blanket of protections shield-
ing the people who invested the government with its power as well as
those who are physically present within the United States."1
II. ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Practical Application
The fourth amendment is indispensable to preserving the liberties of a
democratic society;32 however, the amendment does not require exten-
sion to all situations demonstrating the potential for police misconduct.33
The fear of overzealous law enforcement activity abroad does not sup-
port a finding that foreign searches of the dwellings of nonresident aliens
are protected by the fourth amendment. 34 Thus, in circumstances where
a foreign national is the target of an extraterritorial search or seizure, it is
appropriate to concentrate on the locus of the alleged misconduct to de-
termine if the fourth amendment applies.35
29. See id. at 1230.
30. See id. at 1231.
31. See id. at 1234.
32. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 120-21 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974); see also Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (emphasis on exclusionary rule's deterrent value
does not mean that "anything which deters illegal searches is... commanded by the
Fourth Amendment").
34. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1230-31 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority's holding that Fourth Amendment applies
to foreign search of foreign national's residence fails to recognize Supreme Court's re-
striction on power of the Constitution to act abroad), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687
(U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-1353).
35. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
However, the "joint venture" cases suggest that the fourth amendment applies to raids
by foreign officials on foreign soil if United States federal agents so substantially partici-
pate in the raids as to convert them into joint ventures between U.S. and foreign officials.
The focus is on the involvement of the government actor, rather than upon the citizen-
ship of the individual who is the subject of the search. See, e.g., Stonehill v. United
States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969); Gold v. United
States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967); Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965); Shurman v. United States, 219 F.2d 282 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955); Sloane v. United States, 47 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931). But
see Note, The Fourth Amendment Abroad: Civilian and Military Perspectives, 17 Va. J.
Int'l L. 515, 528 (1977) (who conducted the search is not dispositive in determining
whether evidence should be excluded).
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1. Locus of Conduct
The Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[n]either the Constitu-
tion nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign
territory unless in respect of our own citizens."36 Consequently, in cases
where constitutional protection of aliens has been found to exist,3 7 courts
have been careful to indicate that it is the alien's presence within the
courts' jurisdiction that justifies such a finding.3" Therefore, the site of
the violation is a pivotal factor in determining whether an alien is entitled
to fourth amendment protection.
Fourth amendment violations occur at the location of the wrongful
search or seizure.39 When an individual alleges a fourth amendment vio-
lation in foreign territory, the government action occurs on foreign soil.'
Although the Constitution protects United States citizens regardless of
36. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); see also
Stephan, Constitutional Limits on International Rendition of Criminal Suspects, 20 Va. J.
Int'l L. 777, 785 (1980) (extending rights to aliens outside United States is contrary to
long-established tradition holding the Constitution to be an agreement between a govern-
ment and its citizens).
It has been suggested that none of the Bill of Rights protections should be extended to
non-residents, at least not to those without some permanent affiliation with the United
States. See Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 747 n.29; see also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464-65
(1891) ("[t]he framers of the Constitution... never could have supposed that all the
guarantees in the administration of the law.., at home were to be transferred [abroad]").
But see Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21 (1866) ("The Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people.., and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."); Stonehill v. United States,
405 F.2d 738, 751 (9th Cir. 1968) (Browning, J., dissenting) ("Because our government
'is entirely a creature of the Constitution,' it is bound to respect the limitations which the
Constitution imposes upon its powers, whether it acts at home or abroad."), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 960 (1969); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 244 (1979) ("It is a first
principle of American life.., that everything American public officials do is governed by
... the United States Constitution.").
37. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (fifth amendment due process
protection applied equally to all aliens, whether their presence within territorial jurisdic-
tion of court was unlawful, involuntary, or transitory); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (aliens within United States territory may invoke fifth and sixth
amendment protections); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir. 1979) (alien
within territorial jurisdiction of the United States is entitled to fifth amendment protec-
tion in criminal proceedings).
38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also N. Alexander, supra note 19, at
125 ("[A]fter an alien has been admitted lawfully [to the United States] 'he becomes
entitled ... to ... all the guaranties of life, liberty, and property secured by the constitu-
tion.' " (citation omitted)).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (fourth amendment
violation fully accomplished at time of unlawful search or seizure); United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (same).
40. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1239 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-
1353).
The introduction of illegally seized evidence does not constitute an independent fourth
amendment violation. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906; see also United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.




their location, non-citizens cannot carry constitutional rights outside the
United States."1 Because the ties of citizenship and presence within the
jurisdiction do not exist, the Bill of Rights protections afforded the non-
citizen in a foreign country are distinct from the protections granted
within United States borders.42
Extraterritorial application of the fourth amendment is distinguishable
from the application of fifth and sixth amendment protections to non-
citizens4" because fifth and sixth amendment violations occur when the
defendant is on trial.' Consequently, the locus of these violations is
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.45 Thus, the fact
that a nonresident alien is entitled to fifth and sixth amendment rights
during a criminal proceeding in the United States does not support ex-
tending fourth amendment protection to a search occurring abroad,
where the United States is not sovereign.46
41. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1240 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (American flag
does not follow nonresident aliens beyond United States territorial limits); Note, Unalien-
able Rights?, supra note 13, at 670 (despite their willingness to recognize some constitu-
tional protections for aliens, courts show great reluctance to grant protections from
government conduct when the action complained of occurs abroad); cf. Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (government directed to exert power of United States
solely on behalf of citizens in jeopardy abroad). But see In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia
on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1308 n.6 (9th Cir. 1982) (Australian residents have
standing to raise constitutional objections to the limitations on liability imposed by the
Warsaw Convention); Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583, 591 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (noting
that fifth amendment's just compensation clause applied to takings of property outside
the United States), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); Kukatush Mining Corp. v. SEC,
309 F.2d 647, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (nonresident alien may have standing if court has
jurisdiction of subject res or if the case involves preferred immigration rights); Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.D.C. 1976) (nonresident alien
has constitutional standing in certain circumstances). See generally United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (Constitution powerless in foreign
territory unless asserted to protect United States citizens).
42. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950) (nonresident aliens do
not stand on same footing as American citizens where alleged unconstitutional action of
United States officials in foreign countries is concerned); United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (aliens outside
territorial limits of United States stand on different constitutional footing than aliens
found either permanently or temporarily within this country's borders), cert. granted, 57
U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-1353).
43. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 36, at 787 ("[A] violation of due process takes place
not when the government initially acts unacceptably against an alien outside the United
States, but rather later when the wrongfully seized alien... is presented for trial within
the United States."); see also United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Mivka, J., concurring) (fifth amendment focuses on trial and prosecution); Brulay v.
United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.5 (9th Cir.) (fifth amendment violated when infringing
statement is received in evidence), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967).
45. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1239 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
46. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) ("The fact that all persons... are
protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all
aliens are entitled to ... all the advantages of citizenship or ... that all aliens must be
placed in a single homogeneous legal classification."); Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at
1237-38 (Wallace, J., dissenting). But see Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1224 (absurd
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2. Exclusionary Rule
The most common remedy for a fourth amendment violation, and the
practical means by which an individual's rights are protected, is the ex-
clusion at trial of evidence that was obtained in violation of the amend-
ment.' The exclusionary rule is designed to deter disregard for
constitutional prohibitions and to give substance to constitutional rights
by barring the government from realizing directly the fruits of its own
deliberate lawlessness.4" Protection of the individual is still, however, the
primary focus of the remedy;49 restricting the government is a necessary
corollary to effecting the rule's remedial purpose." This focus is further
that alien has fifth amendment due process protection, is entitled to fair trial under sixth
amendment and is to be denied fourth amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure). See generally Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312
(1922) (Constitution in force wherever and whenever sovereign power of United States
government is exerted).
47. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (exclusionary rule
adopted to effectuate fourth amendment guarantees); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960) (rule encourages respect for constitutional safeguards against unreasona-
ble invasions of personal liberty); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evi-
dence taken in violation of individual's constitutional rights should not be permitted at
trial).
The rule is a court-created device designed to deter federal officers from violating the
rights of individuals under the fourth amendment. Although the amendment, by its lan-
guage, does not require the exclusion of evidence, see Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d
345, 348 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967), the leading cases on the rule
adopted the view that "'exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the [fourth
amendment] privilege,' "see Note, supra note 35, at 519 & n.22 (quoting United States v.
Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945)).
48. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961). Today, many believe that it is the
exclusionary rule, and not the fourth amendment, that prohibits illegal behavior by law
enforcement officials. See MacDougall, The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives-
Remedies for Constitutional Violations in Canada and the United States, 76 J. Crim. Law
& Criminology 608, 618 (1985); see also J. Hirschel, supra note 3, at 9 (exclusionary rule
regarded as primary means of preserving fourth amendment rights by sanctioning police
behavior).
Justice Brennan views the exclusionary rule as "'part and parcel of the Fourth
Amendment's limitation upon [governmental] encroachment of individual privacy ...
[giving] to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him.'
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
49. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (evidence excluded only if
court finds individual's constitutional rights have been violated); J. Varon, supra note 7,
at 839 (contraband not susceptible to exclusion unless obtained in violation of arrestee's
constitutional right); MacDougall, supra note 48, at 657 (exclusionary rule as a remedial
device should be used to correct the condition repugnant to the Constitution); Stephan,
supra note 36, at 788 (right to have evidence suppressed does not exist unless the court
determines that the United States government acted unacceptably overseas by violating
the constitutional rights of the person upon whom it acted).
50. The government could be disciplined by other methods that do not have the pres-
ervation of individual rights as their primary purpose. See, ag., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1984) (possibility of declaratory relief against the INS offers an
alternative means of challenging agency practices which violate fourth amendment
rights); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 399 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (federal courts have power to award money dam-
ages for violation of constitutionally protected interests). Another example of such a
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demonstrated by standing rules, which permit the exclusionary rule to be
invoked only by individuals whose fourth amendment rights have been
violated.51
Nevertheless, in cases in which evidence is secured outside the United
States allegedly in violation of fourth amendment principles, courts have
tended to focus only upon the suppression issue-whether such evidence
should be excluded from United States criminal proceedings-instead of
addressing the basic question of whether a constitutional violation had
actually occurred.2 When the government acts abroad on foreign na-
tionals who lack substantial ties with the United States, constitutional
constraints are doubtful.53 Therefore, the purpose of the exclusionary
rule-to protect the individual from constitutional violations 4 -would
not be served if applied in situations where constitutional protection is, at
remedy is found in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), which provides that every person who, under
color of state law, deprives any citizen or other person within United States jurisdiction
of rights secured by the Constitution or other law shall be liable to the injured party in an
action at law, in equity, or any proper proceeding of redress.
51. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969) ("suppression of the
product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose
rights were violated by the search... not by those who are [merely] aggrieved.., by the
introduction of damaging evidence"). The Alderman Court further noted that "federal
courts in numerous cases, and with unanimity, have denied standing to one not the victim
of an unconstitutional search and seizure to object to the introduction in evidence of that
which was seized." Id. at 172 n.5 (quoting Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121
(1942)); see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (individual has fourth
amendment standing to invoke exclusionary rule only when challenged conduct invades
"his legitimate expectation of privacy [and not] that of a third party"); Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 133-40 (1978) (no authority to exclude evidence under fourth amendment
absent finding that individual's own constitutional rights were violated by unlawful gov-
ernment activity); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (standing to in-
voke exclusionary rule restricted "to situations where the Government seeks to use such
evidence to incriminate the victim of the unlawful'search"). The Payner Court also re-
marked that "Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond any doubt that the
interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at
the instance of a party who was not the victim of the challenged practices." Payner, 447
U.S. at 735. See generally Simien, supra note 23, at 574 (to satisfy standing require-
ments, fourth amendment claimant must demonstrate actual harm directly related to
unlawful search and seizure).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1974) (only ques-
tion considered by court was whether participation by American officials was so extensive
as to require that statements be excluded), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975); see also
Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 762-64.
53. See Stephan, supra note 36, at 780.
54. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (rule adopted to effectu-
ate individual's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-76 (1969) (exclusionary rule may
be invoked only by those whose fourth amendment rights are infringed). But see United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (primary, though not sole purpose of the rule, is
to deter unlawful police conduct). See generally United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856
F.2d 1214, 1246 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (no authority tojustify exclusion
of evidence absent a constitutional violation), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr.




B. Purported "Extraterritorial" Application
The fourth amendment is generally construed narrowly to protect only
those who can claim ties of residency or citizenship to the United
States. 6 There are situations, however, in which it appears that the
amendment is broadly applied. For example, United States v. Tos-
canino 57 held that a nonresident foreign national could invoke the fourth
amendment to protest the seizure of evidence by United States agents
abroad when egregious methods that "shock the conscience" were em-
ployed in bringing the defendant to trial.58 Although at first blush it
appears that Toscanino allows nonresident aliens to invoke fourth
amendment protection for extraterritorial activities, the Toscanino hold-
ing, in practice, is very limited. 9 The court itself stated that it was the
government's use of outrageous methods in bringing Toscanino within
the court's jurisdiction that demanded a remedy.' ° Therefore, courts
take extreme care not to expand the doctrine any further and very few
cases fit the Toscanino exception.6' As one court noted, "[w]hile Tos-
55. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) ("The deterrent purpose
of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful...
conduct which has deprived the defendant of some [constitutional] right.").
It is indispensable to the alien's suppression argument that he be entitled to fourth
amendment protection because the "[e]xclusion of evidence cannot be used against every
exercise of discretion .... [It is] [t]he nature of the violation [which] determines ... the
remedy." MacDougall, supra note 48, at 657; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 919 (1984) (exclusionary rule "should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable
law enforcement activity"); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969) (rule
does not "provide that illegally seized evidence is inadmissible against anyone for any
purpose"); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.) (exclusionary rule "not
fashioned to vindicate a broad, general right to be free of agency action not 'authorized'
by law, but rather to protect certain specific, constitutionally protected rights of individu-
als"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
56. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text; see also Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d
217, 223 (D.C. Cir.) (aliens in this country are protected by the fourth amendment), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
57. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
58. Defendant was illegally apprehended abroad, abducted by government agents and
tortured for several weeks before being transported to the United States. See id. at 269-
71. The court, reviewing the heinous methods used to bring Toscanino to trial, see id. at
269-70, found that the court's exercise of power over his person represented the fruits of
the government's exploitation of its deliberate misconduct. See id. at 275. "Having un-
lawfully seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment ... the government
should as a matter of fundamental fairness be obligated to return him to his status quo
ante." Id.
59. See, e-g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1244 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting) ("Toscanino presented a unique fact situation."), cert. granted, 57
U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-1353).
60. See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275-76.
61. Reluctance to extend Toscanino beyond its carefully drawn boundaries was
demonstrated by the Second Circuit's subsequent decision in United States ex rel. Lujan
v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). The Lujan court
held that absent the allegation of egregious government conduct, forcible abduction of a
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canino definitely signals a trend toward liberalizing the general rule [that
nonresident aliens do not have standing to challenge unconstitutional ac-
tion abroad], the court's caveat makes clear that it is simply another ex-
ception to that [general rule].""2
Other cases, involving Coast Guard actions and immigration and de-
portation proceedings, apply various regulations and constitutional pro-
visions to facilitate law enforcement activities in these special areas63 and
represent exceptions to the restrictive view of the fourth amendment.
For example, although the fourth amendment requires "probable
cause ' 6  before a search can be effected, "reasonable suspicion" is
enough to permit Coast Guard searches on the high seas.65 In addition,
person from a foreign country to bring him to the United States would not violate due
process. See id. at 66; see also United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir.) (Toscanino
does not apply if alleged mistreatment is not at hands of United States agents), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
62. Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.D.C. 1976) (em-
phasis added).
63. For example, 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982) was intended to give the Coast Guard the
broadest authority available under the law. See United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058,
1068 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); see also United States v. Cadena,
585 F.2d 1252, 1257-59 (5th Cir. 1978) (statute not limited on its face to domestic vessels;
jurisdiction over the offense conferred authority under the statute to search and seize
foreign vessels). The text of § 89(a) reads in pertinent part:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United
States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of viola-
tions of laws of the United States. For such purposes ... officers may at any
time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of
any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the
ship's documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel ....
14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1982).
In United States v. Cortes, 588 F.2d 106, (5th Cir. 1979), the court discussed the appli-
cability of the fourth amendment to sea searches conducted beyond United States territo-
rial jurisdiction. The Cortes court analyzed the legality of a Coast Guard search on the
high seas in light of fourth amendment principles, concluding that, because of the vessel's
inherent mobility and the possibility that it would weigh anchor and flee, the boarding
was not unreasonable for fourth amendment purposes. See id. at 110-11; see also United
States v. Demanett, 629 F.2d 862, 866 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying fourth amendment to
both Americans and Colombians in sea search whether vessel was in United States terri-
torial waters or on high seas), cert denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); United States v. Cadena,
585 F.2d 1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1978) (extending fourth amendment applicability beyond
domestic vessels and United States citizens). But see United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d
1063, 1091 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting absence of Supreme Court precedent that fourth
amendment restricts government action as to foreign vessel on high seas); Saltzburg,
supra note 8, at 746 (many sea-search decisions do not consider fourth and fifth amend-
ment limitations). See generally United States v. Freeman, 579 F.2d 942, 947 (5th Cir.
1978) (boardings pursuant to provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) are "statutorily author-
ized and constitutionally permissible").
64. See supra note 1.
65. See United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135
(1982); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1087 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Warren, 578 F.2d 1058, 1064-65 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956
(1980). It is the circumstances and exigencies of the maritime setting and its extensive
federal regulation that affords individuals on vessels a lesser expectation of privacy.
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in order to combat the increasing drug problem, the reasonableness of
searches beyond the contiguous zone66 may now be judged under a more
lenient standard than other searches.6 7
Searches on the high seas call sovereignty issues into question.68 The
Constitution is in force "wherever and whenever the sovereign power of
[the United States] government is exerted."' 69 Thus, according to estab-
lished principles of sovereignty, 70 the fourth amendment may restrict
high seas searches of vessels, including those manned by foreign nation-
als.7" The foreign sovereign, however, has exclusive jurisdiction over the
residence of a foreign national on foreign soil. 7 2 Consequently, cases that
extend constitutional protection under maritime regulations cannot be
used to support extension of the fourth amendment to searches within
another sovereign's territorial jurisdiction.73
Immigration and deportation cases, while also standing on special
footing,74 recognize the inherent distinction between resident and nonres-
ident aliens and the protections due each group.75 Courts have acknowl-
66. The contiguous zone is the area of water stretching three to twelve miles from the
coast. See Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 748.
67. See United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 29 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958
(1983); see also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 522(2)(a) & comment c
(1986) ("Ships other than those specified in Subsection (1) are not subject to interference
on the high seas, but a... law enforcement ship of any state may board such a ship.., if
there is reason to suspect that the ship a) is engaged in piracy, slave trade .... ).
68. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting), cert granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-
1353).
69. Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922) (emphasis added).
70. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1242 (Wallace, J., dissenting) ("Each nation is
accorded a limited right of sovereignty under maritime law over any vessel whose passage
may affect ... national interests.").
71. See id. at 1242 (Wallace, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Peterson, 812
F.2d 486, 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing extraterritorial applicability of fourth
amendment in context of search upon the high seas). But see United States v. Williams,
617 F.2d 1063, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Roney, J., concurring) (noting fourth
amendment does little to control activities of law enforcement officers acting on the seas).
72. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1242 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
73. See Williams, 617 F.2d at 1084 (substantial differences between vessels and struc-
tures on land preclude assumptions that cases defining what is "reasonable on land auto-
matically control ... what is reasonable on the high seas"); cf United States v. Freeman,
579 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1978) (recognizes "substantial distinction between a land-
locked vehicle and a nautical vessel for Fourth Amendment purposes").
74. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982). Landon stands for the principle that
an alien seeking initial admission to the United States can claim no constitutional rights
regarding his application, since the power to admit or exclude belongs exclusively to the
sovereign. See id. at 32; see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 210 (1953) (overseas alien has no constitutional right to negotiate the terms of his
entry into this country).
75. See, e.g., Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958) (where aliens are
within United States, "the Court has recognized additional rights and privileges not ex-
tended to those.., who are merely 'on the threshold of initial entry' ") (quoting Shaugh-
nessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)); see also Kwong Hai Chew
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 600 (1953) (fifth amendment protection does not extend to
excludable aliens); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring)
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edged that, although resident aliens are entitled to due process
protection, the protection of aliens who have not been admitted into this
country is quite different.76 Certain courts, anticipating indiscriminate
constitutional expansion, have warned that "[a] great extension of the
constitutional rights of aliens might defeat [congressional policy] and...
imperil national security." 77
C. Extraterritorial Application as a Distortion
of Constitutional Principles
The scope of an alien's constitutional rights is inextricably linked to
the extent to which he has chosen to assume obligations within the
United States. 78 "Because the Government's obligation of protection [of
the individual] is correlative with the duty of loyal support inherent in
the [individual's] allegiance,"' 79 an alien cannot claim that he is entitled
to the spectrum of constitutional rights available to citizens or resident
("The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for [an] alien seeking admission ... to these
shores.").
76. In Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958), petitioner, a native of China,
arrived in the United States claiming citizenship on the ground that her father was a
United States citizen. See id. at 186. Failing to establish this claim, she was ordered
excluded and applied for a stay of deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. The Act currently reads: "The Attorney General shall not deport
or return any alien... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in such country .... ." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
The Court rejected petitioner's contention that because she was "within the United
States" by virtue of her physical presence as a parolee, she was entitled to section 243(h)
protection. See Leng May, 357 U.S. at 188. The Leng May Court emphasized that "our
immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to
our shores seeking admission .... and those who are within the United States after an
entry, irrespective of its legality." Id. at 187.
In Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945), petitioner was an Australian native who
entered the United States in 1920. See id. at 137. In 1938, deportation proceedings were
instituted against him on the ground that he was affiliated with the Communist Party.
See id. His petition for a writ of habeus corpus was denied, see id. at 140, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. See id. Finding that petitioner's detention was unlaw-
ful on its face, see id. at 156, the Court found it unnecessary to adjudicate the larger
constitutional questions advanced in the detention challenge. See id. at 156-57. Nonethe-
less, Justice Murphy, in his concurrence, remarked that "[t]he power to exclude and
deport aliens is one springing out of the inherent sovereignty of the United States....
Since an alien obviously brings with him no constitutional rights, Congress may exclude
him... for whatever reason it sees fit." Id. at 161 (citations omitted). See generally de
Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758) ("Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a
foreigner into the country.... .") (quoted in Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 963-64 (1 1th
Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985)).
77. N. Alexander, supra note 19, at 37.
78. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1236 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-
1353); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("[O]nce an alien gains admis-
sion [to the United States] and begins to develop the ties that [accompany residency], his
constitutional status changes accordingly."); Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210, 211 (1877)
("As a foreigner domiciled in the country .... [the alien] owed allegiance'to the govern-
ment of the country so long as he resided within its limits ...
79. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950).
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aliens without assuming even a temporary duty of allegiance to the
United States.8" Courts have taken care to ensure that the fundamentals
of this doctrine are preserved by requiring the alien's presence within the
jurisdiction before granting constitutional protection.8'
Extending the fourth amendment to non-resident aliens, however, dis-
torts this principle. This is especially true in light of prior judicial inter-
pretations of the Constitution holding that "some measure of allegiance
to the United States, as evidenced by citizenship or residency, is the quid
pro quo for receiving the privilege of invoking [the] Bill of Rights as a
check on the extraterritorial actions of United States officials.",82 Thus,
an alien who has no stronger ties to the United States than the fact that
he is being tried here83 should not be allowed to claim fourth amendment
protection with respect to actions that occurred outside the United
States.4
III. VIABLE ALTERNATIVES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Legislation and certain interpretations of constitutional protections
enunciated in the last decade provide viable means of coping with undis-
ciplined law enforcement activities as an alternative to sweeping fourth
amendment expansion. For example, overzealous activities on the part
of drug agents led to congressional enactment of a statute barring Ameri-
can agents from being present at the scene of searches and seizures in
foreign countries. 86
The "shock the conscience" exception developed by the Second Circuit
in Toscanino 87 is also available to redress situations where outrageous,
reprehensible conduct is employed in apprehending citizens, resident
aliens and foreign nationals alike.88 This standard helps to eradicate the
80. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1237 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
81. By voluntarily establishing residence within the United States, aliens assume a
duty of temporary allegiance to the United States during the period of their residency.
See Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872). As a consequence of
this allegiance, aliens are entitled to many of the same rights as citizens. See Eisentrager,
339 U.S. at 769-71.
82. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1236 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wal-
lace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-1353).
83. See id. at 1237 (Wallace, I., dissenting) (being held in custody in United States
does not establish residency necessary for fourth amendment guarantees); cf Jean v. Nel-
son, 727 F.2d 957, 969 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (detention of alien in custody pending admissibil-
ity determination in immigration proceeding does not legally constitute entry and has no
effect on status under law), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
84. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
85. See United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 748 n.11 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 936 (1973).
86. See International Narcotics Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2291(c)(1) (1982).
87. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 269-71 (2d Cir. 1974).
88. In addition, in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), the Court remarked
that, while certain law enforcement practices may not violate the Constitution, they may
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fear that the United States government will engage in conduct unfettered
by the Bill of Rights.
The principles of international law are also available to constrain egre-
gious extraterritorial actions by United States government agents.8 9 In-
ternational law does not demand that aliens be accorded treatment equal
to that of nationals, only that the alien be treated in conformity with the
basic standards of human decency.90 In an extraterritorial search of the
residence of a foreign subject conducted by United States officials, it is
the responsibility of the foreign government to ensure that the rights of
the individual are protected.91
Furthermore, two sovereign nations may use their treaty making
power to provide protections identical to those under the fourth amend-
ment to non-resident aliens in their respective countries. For example,
some treaties in effect between the United States and foreign govern-
ments contain provisions that closely parallel constitutional prohibitions
against unreasonable searches and seizures.92 This treaty making power
be "so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction." Id, at 431-32.
89. See A. Roth, supra note 19, at 95 ("The propriety of governmental acts should be
put to the test of international standards. The treatment of an alien, in order to constitute
an international delinquency should amount to... wilful neglect of duty ... so far short
of international standards that every reasonable ... man would readily recognize its
insufficiency.") (quoting U.S.A. (L.F. Neer) v. United Mexican States, Op. of Comm. 71
(1927) (A.D., 1925-26, case No. 154))).
90. See id. at 96 (test of propriety of authorities' actions regarding aliens is "whether
aliens are treated in accordance with the ordinary standards of civilization"). Therefore,
a different treatment of nationals and aliens, without more, does not give rise to a viola-
tion of international law. See id. at 83.
91. See id. at 87 (in absence of central authority to enforce standard of duty upon
State of residence, international law grants home State the right to demand compensation
for injuries suffered by its subjects in foreign territory); see also United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1248 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wallace, J., dissenting) (safeguarding
interests of foreign citizens is a responsibility that must fall on their own governments),
cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-1353).
This same principle was espoused by the Private Property Committee appointed by the
Executive Council of the International Law Association in 1925. The Committee, refer-
ring to the limits placed upon the rights exerted by one State upon the subjects of an-
other, stated in part that " '[t]he latter remain under the protection of their own sovereign
who is entitled to demand that a certain standard of conduct shall be observed towards
them by a State in whose territory they find themselves.'" A. Roth, supra note 19, at 109
(quoting International Law Association, Vienna Conference, Report of the Protection of
Private Property Committee 9 (1926)); see also United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063,
1089-90 (5th Cir. 1980) (Panama's consent forecloses defendant's argument of violation
of international law); United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir.
1975) (abduction from foreign country violates international law when offended state ob-jects to conduct), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
92. See, e.g., Damrosch, supra note 11, at 504.
For example, the treaty between the United States and Pakistan contains a clause on
security and protection of persons and property similar to the Fourth Amendment. See
Treaty of Friendship and Commerce Between the United States of America and Pakistan,
Nov. 12, 1959, art. VI, 12 U.S.T. 110, 113, T.I.A.S. No. 4683 at 4.
The United States-Italian Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation contains a
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has provided a means of bestowing additional rights upon aliens.
93
In addition, Congress has the power to enact a statute or agency regu-
lation governing the actions of United States officials which could en-
compass existing fourth amendment probable cause standards, act as a
limitation on extraterritorial police activity, and outline a standard of
behavior against which all questionable activity could be judged.94 Such
an enactment would discourage arbitrary searches and seizures con-
ducted on foreign soil and bypass the constitutional issue altogether
while simultaneously providing protection for those who may be subject
to such searches.95
Directing the conduct of United States agents by statute or regulation
provision granting protection against unreasonable search and seizure to the citizens of
each contracting nation by stating that
dwellings.., and all premises... located in the territories of the other High
Contracting Party, shall not be subject to unlawful entry or molestation. There
shall not be made . . . any search of. . . such dwellings . . . except under
conditions and in conformity with procedures no less favorable than the condi-
tions and procedures prescribed for nationals... under the applicable laws and
regulations within the territories thereof.
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, United States-Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art.
VI, 63 Stat. 2255, 2264, 79 U.N.T.S. 171, 180 (1948).
In applying the terms of the treaty, the court in United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370
(2d Cir. 1983) found that appellants were entitled to all the rights granted to American
citizens in similar circumstances. That is, within a search and seizure context, fourth
amendment provisions apply. See id. at 376-77.
93. See N. Alexander, supra note 19, at 23-24. Congressional authority, expressly
limited by the enumerated powers doctrine, does not include extraterritorial jurisdiction
over individual aliens. The treaty making power, however, is not subject to such restric-
tions. Therefore, the federal government may use this power to grant aliens rights relat-
ing to a subject over which Congress is given no control by the Constitution. See id. at 24.
The Supreme Court in Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890), made the following
pronouncement:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited except
by those restraints which are found in that instrument .... [I]t is not perceived
that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touching any
matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.
Id. at 267. But see Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 155 (D.D.C.
1976) (no agreement with foreign nation can confer power on any branch of government
which is free from constitutional restraints).
Other constitutional provisions which permit the exercise of extraterritorial powers do
not grant Congress the power to regulate the activity of individuals on foreign soil. The
commerce clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The necessary and proper clause presupposes the existence
of an underlying right by giving Congress the power "to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers." U.S. Const. art
I, § 8, cl. 18.
94. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (aliens outside
United States borders are accorded only that degree of protection provided by executive
or administrative decisions). Thus, any violation would be statutory, and constitutional
adjudication would be avoided.
95. Cf. Richardson, Why the Fourth Amendment Doesn't Stand Still, 26 Judges' J. 48,
48 (1987) (to preserve fourth amendment interests, balance must be struck, giving privacy
a broad, flexible scope while simultaneously permitting intrusions by certain individuals
under carefully outlined circumstances).
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would also eliminate the need for compliance with the warrant require-
ment mandated by the fourth amendment. Because a warrant issued by
a United States judge carries no weight on foreign soil,96 such a require-
ment would be an unnecessary hindrance to effective, expedient law en-
forcement.9 7 Furthermore, requiring United States officials to obtain a
warrant before conducting a search in a country whose warrant proce-
dure does not resemble the procedure followed in the United States
would be nonsensical9" because United States agents often conduct
searches abroad only at the will of foreign officials, who decide not only
the search's scope and reasonableness but determine if it will occur at
all.99
Maintaining that the fourth amendment, and therefore its exclusionary
rule, does not apply to the product of searches of foreign nationals on
foreign soil does not suggest that a federal court can never exclude from a
criminal proceeding evidence obtained against an alien by United States
officers. Toscanino recognized that aliens have the fifth amendment right
to challenge the admission of evidence procured through the use of egre-
gious means.c" A rule intended to exclude evidence obtained in viola-
96. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1229-30 (9th Cir.
1988) ("[A] warrant issued by an American magistrate would be a dead letter in Mex-
ico.... [I]t would be an affront to a foreign country's sovereignty if the DEA presented
an American warrant .... "), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No.
88-1353); see also Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 762 (because no American magistrate can
issue search warrant having legal effect in Peru, absence of warrant not crucial).
97. "[T]he cost of judicially imposed constraints on the foreign behavior of [the
United States] government is unacceptably high." Stephan, supra note 36, at 784. When
the United States government acts overseas to protect United States interests, as in the
apprehension of a terrorist or a drug smuggler, judicial barriers would impede, if not
inhibit, these efforts. See id.
98. See Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 767.
99. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1249 (Wallace, J., dissenting); see also Ste-
phan, supra note 36, at 795 (United States government abroad is subordinate sovereign
subject to authority of host country). See generally United States v. Jordan, 1 M.J. 334,
339 (1976) (Cook, J., dissenting) ("a 'foreign government, like a private person, is ... not
subject' to the prohibitions of the United States Constitution" (citation omitted)).
100. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1245 (9th Cir. 1988)
(Wallace, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 57 U.S.L.W. 3687 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1989) (No. 88-
1353); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir. 1974). The majority in
Verdugo had no occasion to query whether such a due process "shock the conscience"
test should be adopted in the case before it, inasmuch as the conduct of the agents search-
ing appellee's residence was "simply not comparable to the official acts of torture, brutal-
ity, or other outrageous invasions of a defendant's bodily security that were present in
those cases where police conduct was found to 'shock the conscience.'" Id.; see also
United States v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1323 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., concurring)
(declining to exclude evidence seized abroad on "shock the conscience" grounds).
Toscanino, on its facts, did not require a fourth amendment determination, although
one was rendered. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d at 1243-44 (Wallace, J., dissenting)
(Toscanino majority concluded that fourth amendment protects nonresident aliens,
although case could have been decided on due process grounds); see also United States ex
rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir.) (Anderson, J., concurring) (same), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). See generally Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 987 (1 1th Cir.
1984) (Kravitch, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("It is a basic proposition
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tion of principles of international law and basic human rights should not
rest solely upon whether an individual is first entitled to the full panoply
of rights available under the fourth amendment. 0 1 "Whether the exclu-
sionary sanction is appropriately imposed in a particular case... is 'an
issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights
of the party seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police
conduct.' "102
CONCLUSION
The fourth amendment, designed to safeguard an individual's right to
be secure in his person and property, cannot be invoked to shelter foreign
citizens on foreign soil from questionable United States government con-
duct. An alien's ability to claim benefits under the fourth amendment in
a search conducted in a foreign nation should depend, not on the partici-
pation of United States law enforcement agents, but rather upon both the
citizenship of the individual asserting a violation of constitutional rights
and the place where the conduct occurred. The fourth amendment, as
part of the constitutional compact between a government and its people,
is not applicable to other peoples of the world, who neither gave it au-
thority nor consented to its rule. Other, more appropriate means may be
employed to achieve the same end-preserving the basic human right to
be free from unreasonable and arbitrary official conduct.
Elizabeth A. Corradino
that 'prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider non-
constitutional grounds for decision.' "), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
101. See Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 775 ("Because those norms which are part of inter-
national law are incorporated in domestic law, courts may want to exclude evidence ob-
tained abroad ... in violation of such norms in order to demonstrate that no civilized
nation should countenance violations of fundamental human rights." (footnote omitted)).
102. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 223 (1983)).
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